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Despite their different perspectives, artificial intelligence (AI) and the disciplines 
of decision science have common roots and strive for similar goals. This paper 
surveys the potential for addressing problems in representation, inference, knowl- 
edge engineering, and explanation within the decision-theoretic framework. Recent 
analyses of the restrictions of several traditional A I  reasoning techniques, coupled 
with the development of more tractable and expressive decision-theoretic representa- 
tion and inference strategies, have stimulated renewed interest in decision theory and 
decision analysis. We describe arly experience with simple probabilistic schemes for 
automated reasoning, review the dominant expert-system paradigm, and survey 
some recent research at the crossroads of A I  and decision science. In particular, we 
present the belief network and influence diagram representations. Finally, we 
discuss issues that have not been studied in detail within the expert-systems setting, 
yet are crucial for developing theoretical methods and computational rchitectures 
for automated reasoners. 
KEYWORDS:  artificial intelligence, belief networks, decision analysis, 
decision theory, explanation, influence diagrams, knowledge ngi- 
neering, operations research, probability, uncertainty 
INTRODUCTION 
Reasoning about act ion under  incomplete  in format ion and scarce resources is 
central  to solv ing diff icult  p rob lems in art i f ic ial  intel l igence (AI).  The t ime is 
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ripe for a synthesis of AI methods and techniques developed in decision science 
for addressing resource allocation and decision making under uncertainty. By 
decision science we mean Bayesian probability and decision theory, the study of 
the psychology of judgment, and their practical application in operations 
research and decision analysis. In particular, decision theory can provide a 
valuable framework for addressing some of the foundational problems in AI, and 
forms the basis for a range of practical tools. 
Artificial intelligence and the decision sciences emerged from research on 
systematic methods for problem solving and decision making that blossomed in 
the 1940s. These disciplines were stimulated by new possibilities for automated 
reasoning unleashed by the development of the computer. Although the fields 
had common roots, AI soon distinguished itself from the others in its concern 
with autonomous problem solving, its emphasis on symbolic rather than numeric 
information, its use of declarative representations, and its interest in analogies 
between computer programs and human thinking. 
Some of the earliest AI research centered on an analysis of the sufficiency of 
alternative approximation strategies and heuristic methods to accomplish the 
task of more complex decision-theoretic representation a d inference (Simon 
[1]). However, many AI researchers soon lost interest in decision theory. This 
disenchantment seems to have arisen, in part, from a perception that decision- 
theoretic approaches were hopelessly intractable and were inadequate for 
expressing the rich structure of human knowledge (Gorry [2], Szolovits [3]). 
This view is reflected in a statement by Szolovits, a researcher who had 
investigated the application of decision theory in early medical reasoning 
systems: "The typical language of probability and utility theory is not rich 
enough to discuss such [complex medical] issues, and its extension with the 
original spirit leads to untenably arge decision problems" (Szolovits, [3], p. 7). 
Although similar views are still widespread among AI researchers, there has 
been a recent resurgence of interest in the application of probability theory, 
decision theory, and decision analysis to AI. In this paper, we examine some of 
the reasons for this renewed interest, including an increasing recognition of the 
shortcomings of some traditional AI methods for inference and decision making 
under uncertainty, and the recent development of more expressive decision- 
theoretic representations and more practical knowledge-engineering techniques. 
The potential contributions of decision science for tackling AI problems 
derive from decision science's explicit theoretical framework and practical 
methodologies for reasoning about decisions under uncertainty. Decisions 
underlie any action that a problem solver may take in structuring problems, in 
reasoning, in allocating computational resources, in displaying information, or 
in controlling some physical activity. As AI has moved beyond toy problems to 
grapple with complex, real-world ecisions, adequate treatment of uncertainty 
has become increasingly important. Attempts to build systems in such areas as 
medicine, investment, aerospace, and military planning have uncovered the 
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ubiquity of uncertainty associated with incomplete models. The discovery of 
useful heuristic procedures can be quite difficult in these complex domains. 
Work in real-world omains has also uncovered the importance of reasoning 
about actions and human values. Traditional AI research as paid little attention 
to modeling of complex preferences and attitudes toward risk. These issues are 
central in decision science, We believe that the correspondence of concerns with 
AI and decision theory will become increasingly obvious as investigators begin 
to enter complex real-world omains that are dominated by uncertainty and high 
stakes. 
We discuss research that applies concepts and techniques from probability, 
decision theory, and decision analysis to problems in AI. After outlining key 
ideas in decision science, we explore advances in the use of decision-theoretic 
ideas in diagnostic expert systems. We examine initial probabilistic approaches 
to expert systems and the heuristic approaches that achieved prominence in the 
mid-1970s. We then review current research on the use of decision-theoretic 
concepts in expert systems, including representation, knowledge ngineering, 
tractable inference, and explanation. Finally, we move beyond expert systems to 
survey applications of decision theory to a variety of topics in AI research. 
Although some researchers have made noteworthy progress, much of this 
work is still in its initial stages. It remains to be seen how effective these 
approaches can be in addressing long-standing problems in AI. It would be 
premature to attempt a comprehensive assessment of the eventual influence of 
this area of research. Our purpose here is simply to present a perspective on 
central issues and to provide pointers to promising avenues of research. 
FOUNDATIONS 
[T]he theory of probability is no more than a calculus of good sense. By 
this theory, we learn to appreciate precisely what a sound mind feels 
through a kind of intuition often without realizing it. The theory leaves 
nothing arbitrary in choosing opinions or in making decisions, and we 
can always select, with the help of this theory, the most advantageous 
choice on our own. It is a refreshing supplement tothe ignorance and 
feebleness of the human mind. (Laplace [41, p. 196). 
The foundations of probability theory extend at least as far back as the 
seventeenth century in the works of Pascal, Bernoulli, and Fermat. Probability 
provides a language for making statements about uncertainty and thus makes 
explicit he notion of partial belief and incomplete information. Decision theory 
extends this language to allow us to make statements about what alternative 
actions are and how alternative outcomes (the results of actions) are valued 
relative to one another. Probability theory and the more encompassing decision 
theory provide principles for rational inference and decision making under 
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uncertainty. These theoretical ideas, however, tell us little about how to apply 
these principles to real problems in a tractable manner; this is the realm of 
decision analysis. In this section, we review central concepts of Bayesian 
probability theory, decision theory, and decision analysis. Our intent is not to 
provide a comprehensive r view of these topics. Rather, we wish to highlight 
several key ideas. 
Probability Is a Measure of  Personal Belief 
A Bayesian or subjectivist views the probability of an event as a measure of a 
person's degree of belief in the event, given the information available to that 
person. A probability of 1 corresponds to belief in the absolute truth of a 
proposition, a probability of 0 to belief in the proposition's negation, and 
intervening values to partial belief or knowledge. According to this perspective, 
probabilities are properties of the state of knowledge of an individual rather than 
properties of a sequence of events (e.g., tosses of a "fair"  coin). This approach 
generalizes the classical notion of a probability as a long-run frequency of a 
"repeatable" event. A subjectivist also is willing to assign belief to unique 
events that are not members of any obvious repeatable sequence of events (e.g., 
the probability that we will finish the manuscript this week). The assignment of a 
subjective probability should be based on all information available to an 
individual, including those items that are known to be true or deducible in a 
logical sense, as well as empirical frequency information. 
A single real number is used to represent the belief that an agent has in the 
truth of a proposition. Subjectivists often draw attention to the state of 
information on which a probability is based, or conditioned, by specifying it 
explicitly. The notation for the probability of a proposition or event X 
conditioned on a state of information ~ may be specified as p(XI ~). To make 
clear that any belief assignment is based on background knowledge, we 
explicitly include ~ in the conditioning statement. Thus, the revised probability 
of X given a new piece of evidence E is written p(XIE, ~), where the comma 
denotes the conjunction of E and ~. 
Subjective probabilities abide by the same set of axioms as do classical 
probabilities or frequencies. The axioms are rules for the consistent combination 
of probabilities for related events. A classic axiomatization of probability 
contains the following definitions~: 
O<p(X l~)< 1 
p(Xl~)+p(not XIe~)= I
p(X or Y{~) =p(X 1 e~) +p( y[~j ) _p(X  and YI~) 
p(X and Yl~)=p(Xl Y, ~:)p( Yl~) 
] Several xiomatizations f probability heory have been proposed. 
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Sets of belief assignments hat are consistent with the axioms of probability 
theory are said to be coherent. In this sense, the theory provides a consistency 
test for uncertain beliefs. Persuasive xamples uggest hat a rational person 
would wish to avoid making decisions based on incoherent beliefs. For example, 
someone willing to bet according to incoherent beliefs would be willing to accept 
a "Dutch book"--that is, a combination of bets leading to guaranteed loss under 
any outcome (Lehman [5], Shimony [61). 
Probability Is Sufficient for Representing Uncertainty 
A number of researchers have provided lists of fundamental properties that 
they consider intuitively desirable for continuous measures of belief in the truth 
of a proposition (Cox [7], Tribus [8], Lindley [9]). A recent reformulation of 
desirable properties of belief is (Horvitz et al. [10]: 
1. Clarity: Propositions hould be well-defined. 
2. Scalar continuity: A single real number is both necessary and sufficient 
for representing a degree of belief in a proposition. 
3. Completeness: A degree of belief can be assigned to any well-defined 
proposition. 
4. Context dependency: The belief assigned to a proposition can depend on 
the belief in other propositions. 
5. Hypothetical conditioning: There exists some function that allows the 
belief in a conjunction of propositions, B(X and Y), to be calculated from 
the belief in one proposition and the belief the other proposition given that 
the first proposition is true. That is, 
B(X and Y) =f[B(X I Y), B( Y)] 
6. Complementarity: The belief in the negation of a proposition is a 
monotonically decreasing function of the belief in the proposition itself. 
7. Consistency: There will be equal belief in propositions that are logically 
equivalent. 
Cox and other researchers have demonstrated that, taken together, these 
properties logically imply that the measure of belief must satisfy the axioms of 
probability theory (Cox [7]). The proof of the necessary relationship between the 
intuitive properties and the axioms of probability theory is based on an analysis 
of solutions to the functional forms implied by the intuitive properties. Thus, 
according to Cox's proof, if one accepts these intuitive properties as desirable, 
one must accept probabilities as a desirable measure of belief. 
These principles provide a useful framework for comparing alternative 
formalisms for representing uncertainty, in terms of which of the principles the 
formalisms reject (Horvitz et al. [10]). For example, fuzzy-set heory (Zadeh 
[11]) rejects the property of clarity, allowing linguistic imprecision in the 
definition of propositions. Some AI researchers have also rejected scalar 
continuity, arguing that a single number is insufficiently rich to represent belief 
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(Cohen [12]). Dempster-Shafer theory (Shafer [13]) rejects completeness, 
denying that it is possible to assign a belief to every well-defined proposition. 
Most heuristic quantitative approaches to representing uncertainty used in AI, 
even when they use the term probability as in Prospector (Duda et al. [14]), 
implicitly violate consistency. 
The Direction of Probabilistic Inference Can Be Reversed 
Probability theory, and in particular Bayes' theorem, allows us to reverse the 
direction of inference. That is, given the influence of hypothesis H on 
observable vidence E, expressed as p(EIH, ~), Bates' theorem allows us to 
compute the influence of E on H, expressed as P(HIE, ~). Commonly, the 
hypothesis H is perceived as causing the evidence E. If H is a disease and E is 
an observable symptom, we can express the evidential relationship n the causal 
direction [i.e., p(EIH, ~)] and then use Bayes' theorem to reverse the inference 
and reason in the diagnostic direction [i.e., P(HIE, ~)] (Shachter and 
Heckerman [15]). This bidirectionality is a consequence of Bayes' theorem. 
Bayes' theorem follows from the last axiom of probability, relating the 
probability of a joint event (i.e.,a conjunction) to conditional probabilities 
(Bayes [16]). The theorem written in its standard form for relating a hypothesis 




Using - H to refer to the negation of H, we can expand this equation to 
p(HIE, ~)= 
p(EIH, ~)p(H[~) 
p(EIH, ~)p(Hl~)+p(E I -1-1, ~)p( -H l~)  
The theorem simply states that the belief in the hypothesis in light of the 
evidence, p(HIE, ~) (the posterior probability), depends on how likely it is that 
we observe a particular piece of evidence given the hypothesis and its negation, 
p(EIH, ~) and p(EI-I-1, ~), and the prior probability of the hypothesis, 
p(nl~).  
The inferential symmetry of probabilistic reasoning can be useful when 
probabilities are available in one direction but are required in the reverse 
direction. For example, domain experts may be more comfortable with 
specifying probabilities in the causal direction, through assessing p(EIH, ~), 
but may wish to calculate beliefs in the diagnostic direction, reasoning about the 
belief in hypotheses given evidence, p(HIE, ~). Representing belief in the 
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causal direction frequently is a more parsimonious and invariant representation 
of the uncertain relationships than is the diagnostic relationship, which will vary 
with prior probabilities (e.g, for different populations). Moreover, in causal 
form, complex relationships among multiple hypotheses and multiple effects can 
be frequently decomposed into simpler elationships from each hypothesis to its 
individual effects, which can be assessed separately. 
Decision Theory Provides a Framework for Reasoning About Preferences 
Decision theory is based on the axioms of probability and utility. Where 
probability theory provides a framework for coherent assignment of beliefs with 
incomplete information, utility theory introduces a set of principles for 
consistency among preferences and decisions. A decision is an irrevocable 
allocation of resources under control of the decision maker. Preferences 
describe a decision maker's relative valuations for possible states of the world, 
or outcomes. The valuation of an outcome may be based on the traditional 
attributes of money and time, as well as on other dimensions of value including 
pleasure, pain, life-years, and computational effort. 
Utility theory is based on a set of simple axioms or rules concerning choices 
under uncertainty. Like the axioms of probability theory, these rules are fairly 
intuitive. The reader is referred elsewhere for a detailed presentation f different 
versions of the axioms, their rationale, and implications (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern [17], Savage [18], de Finetti [19], Fishburn [20]). Here, we only 
try to give the axioms' flavor. 
The first set of axioms concerns preferences for outcomes under certainty. 
The axiom of orderability asserts that all outcomes are comparable, even if 
described by many attributes. Thus, for any two possible outcomes x and y, 
either one prefers x to y or one prefers y to x, or one is indifferent between them. 
The axiom of transitivity assert.s that these orderings are consistent; hat is, if 
one prefers x to y and y to z, then one prefers x to z. These axioms, together with 
two auxiliary axioms, ensure a weak preference ordering of all outcomes. This 
result implies the existence of a scalar value function V(x), which maps from all 
outcomes x into a scalar "value" such that one will always prefer outcomes with 
a higher "value." 
The second set of axioms describes preferences under uncertainty. They 
involve the notion of a lottery, an uncertain situation with more than one possible 
outcome. Each outcome has an assignable probability of occurrence. The 
monotonicity axiom says that, when comparing two lotteries, each with the 
same two alternative outcomes but different probabilities, a decision maker 
should prefer the lottery that has the higher probability of the preferred outcome. 
The decomposability axiom says that a decision maker should be indifferent 
between lotteries that have the same set of eventual outcomes each with the same 
probabilities, even if they are reached by different means. For example, a lottery 
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whose outcomes are other lotteries can be decomposed into an equivalent one- 
stage lottery using the standard rules of probability. The substitutability axiom 
asserts that if a decision maker is indifferent between a lottery and some certain 
outcome (the certainty equivalent of the lottery), then substituting one for the 
other as a possible outcome in some more complex lottery should not affect her 
preference for that lottery. Finally, the continuity axiom says that if one prefers 
outcome x to y, and y to z, then there is some probability p that one is indifferent 
between getting the intermediate outcome y for sure and a lottery with a p 
chance of x (the best outcome) and (1 - p)  chance of z (the worst outcome). 
It follows from accepting the axioms of utility that there exists a scalar utility 
function U(x, d), which assigns a number on a cardinal scale to each outcome x
and decision d, indicating its relative desirability. Further, it follows that when 
there is uncertainty about x, preferred ecisions d are those that maximize the 
expected utility E[ U(x, d) l~] over the probability distribution for x. 
The consistency criteria embodied in classical decision theory can be stated as 
follows: Given a set of preferences expressed as a utility function, belief 
expressed as probability distributions, and a set of decision alternatives, a 
decision maker should choose that course of action that maximizes expected 
utility. The power of this result is that it allows preferences for complex and 
uncertain combinations of outcomes with multiple attributes to be computed 
from preferences expressed for simple components. Thus, it may be used as a 
tool to help people think about complex choices by decomposing them into 
simpler choices. 
A utility function for uncertain situations also allows one to express attitudes 
toward risk, such as risk aversion, when contemplating lotteries involving 
quantitative attributes uch as money. Risk aversion is exhibited by many 
people, when they prefer to receive a monetary prize for certain over a lottery 
with an identical expected value. Decision theory provides various techniques 
for eliciting and encoding different attitudes toward risk for supporting decision 
making under uncertainty (Howard [21]). 
Although file valuation of alternative states and choices about he allocation of 
resources often is central for computational gents, the crucial notions of 
decision and preference have not been addressed in a well-defined manner in AI. 
Decision Theory is Normative 
I f  one finds the axioms of decision theory compelling as principles for rational 
choice, then the theory is normative. In other words the axioms provide a set of 
criteria for consistency among beliefs, preferences, and choices that "should" 
be adhered to by a rational decision maker. Alternatively, given a set of beliefs 
and preferences, the theory prescribes as rational only those decisions that 
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maximize xpected utility. A system that makes decisions or recommendations 
consistent with the axioms may also be termed normative. 2 
It is important to understand that decision theory is not generally proposed as a 
descriptive theory; it does not purport o provide a description of how people 
actually behave when reasoning under uncertainty. Indeed, studies have 
demonstrated that people frequently do not behave in accordance with decision 
theory (Kahneman et al. [22]). In fact, characteristic (and often costly) biases 
exhibited in intuitive judgment are part of the justification for applying decision 
sciences to assist people with decision making, 
Good Decisions Must Be Distinguished from Good Outcomes 
A decision-theoretic perspective distinguishes between a good decision (a 
choice made consistent with preferences and beliefs) and a good outcome (the 
result of a choice that turns out to be desirable). We can labor mightily to elicit 
probabilities, to structure values, and to assess alternatives and still make a 
choice that leads to a bad outcome. Alternatively, a random or poor selection 
may well turn out fortuitously. Such is the nature of acting under incomplete 
information. Decision theory strives for good decisions that lead to better 
outcomes on average. 
Incompleteness and Uncertainty Are Unavoidable 
Systems that reason about real-world problems can represent only a portion of 
reality. It is clear that any computational representation must be a dramatic 
simplification of the objects and relations in the universe that may have 
relevance to a decision problem. The inescapable incompleteness in representa- 
tion leads to unavoidable uncertainties about he state of the world and about he 
consequences of our actions. In practice, uncertainty is particularly acute when 
dealing with multiple actors, complex preferences, high stakes, and long-term 
consequences. 
Decision Analysis Is Applied Decision Theory 
Decision analysis is an engineering discipline that addresses the pragmatics of 
applying decision theory to real-world problems. Decision theory only dictates a
set of formal consistency constraints; it says nothing about how we elicit or 
represent a utility function or probability distribution, or about the manner in 
2 Logic-based reasoning methods also may be considered normative in that hey prescribe a set of 
rules for correct inference under certainty; that is, a system that reasons or makes recommendations 
using these rules may be viewed as normative with respect to deterministic knowledge. 
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which we represent or reason about a decision problem (e.g., the level of 
granularity and detail). It also does not address earch procedures for a utility- 
maximizing decision. Decision analysis, in contrast, addresses these issues 
directly in terms of decision making and tractability. 
The discipline of decision analysis emerged in the 1960's; it grew out of a 
recognition that probability and decision theory, hitherto applied primarily to 
problems of statistical estimation (Savage [18], Raiffa and Schlaifer [23]), also 
could be applied to real-world decision problems (Howard [24], Raiffa [25]). 
Since its inception, decision analysis has grown into an established academic and 
professional discipline (Howard and Matheson [26], Von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards [27], Keeney and Raiffa [28]). There are a number of commercial 
consulting and research firms that perform decision analyses for government and 
private clients. Some large corporations routinely apply decision analysis to 
scheduling, capital expansion, and research and development decisions. The 
emphasis has been on assisting people and organizations faced with high stakes 
and complex resource-allocation problems. 
Decision analysis can be thought of as a set of techniques for focusing 
attention. It provides methods that help a decision maker to clarify the problem 
by explicating decision alternatives, values, and information. It provides a 
variety of techniques for sensitivity analysis, to help a person identify those 
uncertainties and assumptions that could have a significant effect on the decision 
recommendations. The decision maker can then focus attention on those factors 
that make a difference in decisions, and can ignore aspects of the problem that 
turn out to have relatively minor relevance. Resources therefore can be directed 
to the most important or sensitive aspects of the problem. 
EARLY RESEARCH ON EXPERT SYSTEMS 
The area of AI in which decision theory has had the most obvious influence is 
that of diagnostic expert systems. This emphasis has occurred, in large part, 
because xpert systems are often concerned with inference and decision making 
under uncertainty. In this section, we review the early application of 
probabilistic methods in expert systems. We then discuss the more popular 
heuristic approaches that were developed later, partly as a reaction to the 
perceived limitations of the early schemes. 
By expert system, we mean a reasoning system that performs at a level 
comparable toor better than a human expert does within a specified omain. We 
have found it useful to divide tasks for which expert systems have been 
constructed into analytic and synthetic ategories. In systems dedicated to 
analytic tasks, a set of alternatives such as possible diagnoses or decisions either 
are explicitly enumerated or are relatively easy to enumerate; the central task is 
the valuation of the alternatives. With synthetic tasks, the space of alternatives 
Decision Theory in Expert Systems and AI 257 
(e.g., the set of possible configurations or plans) may be extremely large, and 
the main problem is constructing one or more feasible options. Analytic tasks 
include prediction, classification, diagnosis, and decision making about a limited 
set of options. Synthetic tasks include the generation of alternatives, design, 
configuration, and planning. Many of the best-known expert systems address 
analytic tasks, such as medical diagnosis. However, some of the most successful 
systems are applied to synthetic problems, such as R1 for computer hardware 
configuration (McDermott [29]). 
Decision theory provides an appealing approach to analytic tasks, particularly 
to those involving inference and decision making under uncertainty. Conse- 
quently we focus on expert systems for analytic tasks. Decision theory also can 
be relevant to synthetic tasks, because useful alternatives often must be selected 
from large numbers of options. 
Much of the pioneering work in analytic expert systems has been done on 
medical applications, although, more recently, fault diagnosis in electronic 
components and mechanical devices has been examined (de Kleer and Williams 
[30], Genesereth [31]). In general, three kinds of tasks are involved. The first 
task is diagnosis: How can we infer the most probable causes of observed 
problems (e.g, diseases or machine-component failures) given a set of evidence 
(e.g., symptoms, patient characteristics, operating conditions, or test results)? 
The second task is making information-acquisition decisions: Which additional 
information should we request, or which additional tests should we conduct? 
This choice involves weighing the costs of obtaining the information versus its 
benefits in more accurate diagnosis. The third task is making treatment 
decisions: What can we do to ameliorate or cure the problem? 
The Problem of Diagnosis 
First we formulate the problem of diagnostic inference. Suppose we are 
considering a set H of n possible hypotheses, 
H= {H,, HE, " " ,  Hn} 
and a set E of m pieces of evidence, 
E= {E,,/?2, " " ,  E,,} 
Assume that all hypotheses and pieces of evidence are two-valued, logical 
variables, each either true or false. In a deterministic world, we could assume a
relation C(H, E) between hypotheses and evidence, such that c(Hi, Ej) means 
that hypothesis  implies (or causes) evidence j. A diagnosis or explanation is a 
set of zero, one, or more than one hypotheses believed to be present (with all 
others absent). Given a set of evidence E ' ,  the deterministic diagnostic problem 
is to discover one or more diagnoses D _ H that can explain the observed 
evidence. In particular, D should contain, for all Ej in E ' ,  a hypothesis Hi such 
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that c(Hi, Ej). Reggia [32] proposed this formulation of the problem of diagnosis 
and developed set-covering algorithms for finding the minimum set of causes 
that could cover a set of observations. 
In the real world, the relationships among hypotheses and evidence generally 
are uncertain. The probabilistic approach is to represent these relationships as 
the conditional probability distribution p(E' [D, ~) for the evidence, given each 
possible diagnosis D in H. If, in addition, we have the prior probability P(D[ ~) 
for each subset D in H representing the believed prevalence rates of 
combinations of hypotheses, we can apply Bayes' theorem to compute the 
posterior probability of each diagnosis, after observing evidence E '  : 
p(E'  ]D, ~)P(D[}) 
p(D[E', }) -  
p(g'lS) 
The problem of diagnosis is computationally complex. Because a patient may 
have more than one disease out of n possible diseases, the number of possible 
diagnoses (i.e., disease combinations) is 2 n. So the number of independent 
parameters necessary to specify the complete prior distribution is 2 n - 1. For m 
pieces of evidence, the general conditional distribution has 2 m - 1 independent 
parameters given each hypothesis, requiring the specification of 2~(2 m - 1) 
independent parameters in total for all diagnosis. Clearly, this approach is quite 
impractical for more than two or three hypotheses and pieces of evidence 
without some kind of simplification. 
Early Probabilistic Approaches 
A set of research projects on automated probabilistic reasoning for diagnosis 
was undertaken during the 1960s. Two simplifying assumptions often were 
made. First (A1), that the hypotheses in H are mutually exclusive and 
collectively exhaustive. Second (A2), that there is conditional independence of 
evidence given any hypothesis. That is, given any hypothesis H, the occurrence 
of any piece of evidence El, of the component hypotheses i  independent of the 
occurrence of any other piece of evidence Ej: 
p(EiIH, ~)=p(EiIEj, H, ~) 
With assumption A1, the only diagnoses we need to consider are the n 
singleton hypotheses H;. With assumption A2, the conditional probability 
distribution of the evidence E '  given a disease Hi (as required for Bayes 
theorem) can be decomposed into the product of the conditionals for individual 
pieces of evidence as follows: 
p(E' ln i ,  ~)=p(E l ,  E2, "" ", Ej[ni, ~) 
=p(E~lni, ~)p(EzlHi, ~) .. " p(Ejlai, ~) 
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Under the assumptions A1 and A2, only mn conditional probabilities and n - 
1 prior probabilities are required. The simplicity of probabilistic systems based 
on these two assumptions made the approach popular. Numerous medical 
diagnostic systems have been constructed based on the simplified probabilistic 
scheme (Szolovits and Pauker [33]), including systems for the diagnosis of heart 
disease (Warner et al [34], Gorry and Barnett [2]) and of acute abdominal pain 
(de Dombal et al. [35]). The popularity of the simplified probabilistic inference 
has led some people to believe that the assumptions are absolute requirements of 
probabilistic inference. It is a misconception, however, to regard this simplified 
Bayesian scheme as defining practical probabilistic inference. In the section on 
current research we describe the development of more expressive representa- 
tions of probabilistic dependencies. 
Performance of the Early Probabilistic Systems 
How well did these early systems perform in terms of diagnostic accuracy? 
We note that the early probabilistic systems performed within their limited 
domains at a level comparable to experts, and sometimes at a considerably 
higher level (Gorry [2], de Dombal et al. [36], Dawes and Corrigan [37]). For 
example, the system of de Dombal and his colleagues averaged over 90% 
correct diagnoses of acute abdominal pain, where expert physicians were 
averaging 65-80% correct [36]. Patrick's diagnostic aid for chest pain 
reportedly averaged 80% accuracy, where clinicians averaged 51% [38]. These 
systems certainly qualify as expert systems according to our definition. 
It is interesting to ask why these systems performed better than experts given 
that they made oversimplifying assumptions (A1 and A2) and frequently 
considered only a fraction of the information available to physicians. One 
answer is that some of the computer programs were based on statistical nalysis 
of empirical data rather than purely on expert judgment. However, the use of 
more reliable data does not explain the performance of several of the systems in 
which probabilities were based partly or entirely on expert judgment. 
In fact, such good performance of simple models based on subjective 
parameters relative to unaided expert judgment is consistent with well- 
established experimental results from numerous tudies (Dawes and Corrigan 
[37]). Studies in a wide variety of domains of clinical and other expert judgment 
have found that simple linear models with subjectively assessed weights do as 
well as or better than experts. One reason for these results eems to be that the. 
simple formal models are more consistent and reliable than human experts, 
being less subject o whims, carelessness, or misguided inspiration. There also 
are fundamental mathematical reasons why simple linear models can be robust 
approximations to more complex, nonlinear relationships [37]. 
The relevance of these surprising results to research in expert systems and 
artificial intelligence has only recently been pointed out (Hammond [39], Carrol 
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[40]). Several preconditions for the applicability of these results have been 
elucidated. For the results to apply, tasks must fulfill at least wo conditions: (1) 
the behavioral criterion must be some monotonic function of each input, and (2) 
there must be some noise in the inputs or the model, so that even optimal 
performance is limited. These conditions appear to apply to many diagnostic 
tasks in complex areas like medicine. Nevertheless, it is unclear just how well 
simple linear models can do relative to human experts and expert systems for 
different kinds of diagnostic tasks. Further theoretical nd empirical research is 
needed on the usefulness of simple models. Of particular interest is identifying 
and characterizing task attributes that would be useful in predicting the relative 
performance of different approaches. 
Problems Attributed to the Early Expert Systems 
Enthusiasm for probabilistic and decision-theoretic methods faded in the early 
1970s. Given the encouraging performance of these systems, why have they not 
seen wider application? The answer seems to involve a complex tangle of 
factors, including both technical and sociological ones. One often-cited reason is 
the restricted problem domains to which the probabilistic approach as been 
applied. A second reason is the unwarranted simplifying assumptions of mutual 
exclusivity and conditional independence--and the immediate intractabil- 
ity associated with attempts to move beyond the assumptions. More generally, 
critics of the approach have pointed out the limited expressiveness of the 
simplified Bayesian formulation, citing the apparent mismatch between the 
rigorous, formal, quantitative approach of probabilistic inference and the 
informal, qualitative approach characteristic ofhuman reasoning. They suggest 
that he mismatch leads to problems both in encoding expertise and in explaining 
the results of probabilistic inference, so that users could understand and trust 
them (Szolovits [3], Davis [41], Gorry [2]). 
One interesting lesson from the early research on probabilistic reasoning isthe 
distinction between the performance and acceptability ofdiagnostic systems. In 
principle, it might seem that none of the objections we have listed should be 
insuperable in the face of superior diagnostic performance. However, it is clear 
that factors other than simple performance perform a key role in determining 
acceptance. Such factors may include the poor user interface of many early 
systems (Spiegelhalter and Knill-Jones [42]) and the general lack of attention 
paid to how the use of such systems might be integrated with the habits and 
environment of the diagnostic practitioner. 
AI Approaches to Expert Systems 
Concern with the restrictive assumptions of the simplified probabilistic 
scheme coupled with the perception that a combinatoric explosion would 
threaten any attempt to move beyond these assumptions or to larger domains led 
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to disenchantment wi h the approach. At the same time, the new AI techniques 
being developed in the early 1970s appeared to provide a promising alternative 
to the design of expert systems. With the development of heuristic inference 
methods came reduced concern with normative optimality and methods for 
decision and inference under uncertainty. The attention of mainstream AI 
researchers became focused on the crucial role of representing and reasoning 
with large amounts of expert knowledge. Of particular interest was the potential 
of applying these AI reasoning techniques for building larger systems making 
use of richer and more varied expert knowledge than seemed possible for 
Bayesian schemes. Many of the researchers who become involved in the 
development of this new generation of systems came from other backgrounds 
and had little exposure to or interest in the earlier decision-theoretic schemes, 
which fell into relative neglect. 
A key feature of the new expert-system paradigm was the application of the 
production-rule architecture to real-world diagnosis. Production rules had 
appeal as providing a general and flexible scheme for representing expert 
knowledge in a declarative and modular form (Buchanan and Shortliffe [43]). 
The production rule has the form of logical implication. To apply production 
rules in real-world diagnosis, investigators found it desirable to extend the 
representation to represent uncertainty, both about he truth of propositions and 
about he applicability of each production rule. The two best-known attempts to 
develop representations of uncertainty as an extension of deterministic rule- 
based expert systems were the Mycin (Buchanan and Shortliffe [44] and 
Prospector (Duda et al. [14]) projects. 
Mycin was designed to assist physicians in the diagnosis and treatment of 
bacterial infections. Mycin introduced the certainty-factor model. The certainty 
factor (CF) is a number epresenting the degree of confirmation (between 0 and 
1) or disconfirmation (between 0 and - 1) of each proposition or rule. Mycin's 
basic knowledge representation a d uncertain inference scheme have been made 
available for other applications as Emycin and are employed in several 
commercially available xpert-system shells. Prospector was constructed as an 
aid in the identification of mineral deposits of commercial interest. Prospector 
uses probabilistic quantities to represent degrees of belief in propositions, 
although its updating rules are not exactly consistent with a coherent 
probabilistic nterpretation. The developers of both systems have implied in their 
writings that they intended the systems' behaviors as approximations to the 
probabilistic ideal, which they saw as unattainable for the reasons we have 
discussed. 
Problems with the Representation of Prior Belief 
A common objection to probabilistic approaches i  the difficulty of assessing 
prior probabilities--the initial measures of belief assigned to hypotheses before 
new evidence is considered. Empirical data often are hard to obtain, and 
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subjective stimates are deemed to be unreliable. Many heuristic schemes-- 
including Prospector, Casnet, and PIP--also require prior beliefs and so do not 
evade this problem either. But some, including the Mycin certainty factor model 
and Internist-1 (and its descendant QMR), appear to reason without prior belief. 
The Mycin certainty factor (CF) model represents, combines, and propagates 
the effects of multiple sources of evidence in terms of their joint degree of 
confirmation or disconfirmation feach hypothesis of interest. Thus, contrary to 
most popular interpretations, the CF originally was intended to represent an 
update or change in belief induced by the evidence, not an absolute degree of 
belief (such as a probability) (Horvitz and Heckerman [45]). It therefore does 
not explicitly represent the prior or posterior degree of belief in each hypothesis. 
By representing only updates rather than absolute degrees of belief, it appears to 
avoid the need for priors. 
When a CF-based system recommends a decision (for example, when Mycin 
suggests treatment for a suspected infection), it makes use of the CFs assigned to 
the competing diseases to assess the amount of evidence for each. Because it 
makes decisions without any explicit reference to priors or prevalence rates, it 
is, in effect, treating all infections as having equal prior probabilities. 3 The 
Internist-1 and QMR systems make similar assumptions (Heckerman [46]). The 
equal-priors assumption is valid in contexts where diagnoses are believed to be 
equally likely and in contexts where no information is available about he prior 
probabilities. 
Prior beliefs, at some level of precision, frequently are available. For 
example, experienced physicians have significant knowledge about the preva- 
lence rates of different diseases, even though they may find these rates difficult 
to quantify precisely. In fact, diseases often differ in prevalence rates by many 
orders of magnitude. Assuming equal priors could lead to a serious error in a 
treatment recommendation in a case where two diseases with widely differing 
prevalance rates were assigned comparable CFs. For example, the fairly 
prevalent mononucleosis and relatively rare Hodgkins' disease can present with 
a similar set of evidence (microscopic features within a lymph node biopsy); the 
differences in the prior probabilities can be essential in diagnosis and treatment. 
The errors that accrue from assuming equal prior probabilities may be less 
serious in domains where the quantity and quality of evidence typically 
overwhelms the priors. A knowledge ngineer might be warranted in making 
simplifying assumptions about priors, given a demonstrated insensitivity of 
system performance to the assumption coupled with an analysis of the costs of 
representing prior information. However, in general, even approximate infor- 
mation about prior probabilities may be valuable knowledge that is important to 
represent explicitly in a knowledge-based system, and discarding this informa- 
tion can lead to significant errors. 
3 The handling of priors in the CF model is consistent with studies of how people reason under 
uncertainty (Kahneman etal. [22]) that show people tend to ignore priors. 
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Other heuristic systems that explicitly incorporate prior probabilities have 
difficulties due to incoherence in the probabilities. For example, Prospector 
uses probabilities to represent prior degrees of belief in its hypothesis and in its 
evidential variables. The system makes use of two probabilistic quantities that 
overspecify the joint probability distribution. 4 Since these measures are 
assessed independently by the domain expert, and their relationship is not 
intuitively obvious, they generally will be inconsistent with one another. To 
cope with this problem, Prospector employs a heuristic scheme of diagnostic 
inference that employs an interpolation between the conflicting quantities. 
However, the underlying incoherence of the probability distributions limits the 
scope of the inference. For example, the incoherence destroys the bidirectional- 
ity of probabilistic inference, obstructing the graceful integration of causal and 
diagnostic inference. 
Problems with Modularity 
An often-cited advantage of the rule-based representation scheme is the ability 
to add or remove rules from a knowledge base without modifying other rules 
(Davis [47]). This property has been referred to as modularity. The modularity 
of rules in a logical production system is a consequence of the monotonicity of 
logic: Once asserted, the truth of a proposition cannot be changed by other facts. 
This notion of rules as modular epresentation f knowledge in deterministic 
production systems was carried over to rule-based methods for uncertain 
reasoning. However, analysis of modularity has demonstrated that uncertain 
beliefs are intrinsically less modular than beliefs held with certainty, frequently 
making the rule-based calculi inefficient for reasoning with uncertainty 
(Heckerman and Horvitz [48]). It has become apparent hat the traditional 
assumption of modularity in rule-based approaches for reasoning under 
uncertainty has restrictive implications that had not been previously appreciated. 
To explain this we must define modularity more precisely in terms of 
procedures for updating belief in hypotheses (Horvitz and Heckerman [45], 
Heckerman [49]). First we define the notion of a belief update. Suppose B (H, ~) 
denotes a scalar degree of belief in hypothesis H given some specific 
background evidence ~. Let the scalar function U(H, El, ~) denote a belief 
update or a change in some measure of belief for a single hypothesis H, given 
some new evidence El, in the presence of previously acquired background 
evidence. These arguments should be sufficient o determine how we combine 
new evidence with previous evidence to establish the posterior degree of belief 
in H given E~ in the context of the background state of information. Thus, there 
4 The strength ofeach rule linking evidence E with hypothesis H is represented by two numbers, 
representing the two likelihood ratios; LS = p(EIH, ~)/p(E I -H, ~) and LN = p(-EIH, ~)/ 
p( -E  I -H, ~). 
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should be some scalar function f such that 
B(H, El A ~)=f(U(H, El, ~), B(H, ~)) 
In general, the update U(H, El, 4) may depend on other evidence in the 
background information ~. Thus, a belief update would have to be specified for 
every H and relevant El. Clearly, this poses an intractable representation a d 
inference problem. The simplifying assumption of modularity in rule-based 
systems is that the update associated with a piece of evidence El is independent 
of all other evidence. We define the modular update property as 
U(H, El, ~)= U(H, El, Ei/k ~) for all Ei i~ 1 
Now suppose there are two pieces of evidence, El and/?2, that bear directly 
on the hypothesis H. We say that the combination of updates is modular if a 
single belief update encompassing the effects of El and/?2 on H is a simple 
function of the two separate updates. Thus, we define the modular combination 
property as 
U(H, El ^ Ez, ~)=g(U(H, El, ~), U(H, E2, ~)) 
where g is a scalar function that is continuous and monotonically increasing in 
each argument, given that the other argument is held constant. The modular 
combination property follows directly from the modular update property for 
each of the two component updates. 
Now let us apply these ideas in the probabilistic framework. A well-known 
form of probabilistic update is the likelihood ratio. Heckerman has shown that 
any probabilistic belief update must be some monotonic transformation f the 
likelihood ratio (Heckerman [50]). 
If we divide Bayes' theorem for hypothesis H, evidence E, and background 
evidence ~ by Bayes' theorem for the negation of the hypothesis, -H ,  we get 
P(HIE, ~) P(Eln,  ~)p(H[~) 
p( -H[E ,  ~) p(E[ -H,  ~)p( -H[~)  
This is called the odds-likelihood form of Bayes' theorem. From left to right, 
the first and last ratios are, respectively, the posterior and prior ratios of 
probability, or the odds. We write these ratios as O(HIE, ~) and 0(1tl ~). The 
second ratio is the likelihood ratio, for which we use the term X(H, E, ~). We 
can rewrite the odds-likelihood equation as: 
O(H[g, O=X(H,  E, ~)O(H[~) 
This shows that the posterior odds of H given E is the product of the likelihood 
ratio and the prior odds of H. In this case, the update function f is simply the 
product of its arguments. 
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Suppose we want to combine the updates on H from two pieces of evidence, 
EL and Ez. For the combination function to have the modular combination 
property, we require that E1 and E2 be conditionally independent given H and 
-H .  From the definition of k, it then follows that 
k(H, EL A E2, ~)= X(H, E2, ~)X(H, El, ~) 
That is, the modular combination function g for likelihoods is also the product of 
its arguments, the two component likelihoods. Thus, for updating schemes based 
on the multiplication of likelihood ratios (such as probabilistic interpretations of 
the popular rule-based schemes), modularity requires a stronger form of 
conditional independence than that required for the simplified probabilistic 
scheme described earlier. 
All modular updating schemes assume that all pieces of evidence bearing on 
the belief in a hypothesis H can be combined to determine an overall effect on 
H, through examining the belief in each piece of evidence. If the beliefs in the 
pieces of evidence are each represented by a scalar, they cannot explicitly 
express the possible dependence b tween them. The representation simply is not 
rich enough. Capturing the effects of arbitrary dependencies in a modular 
scheme generally requires information that is unavailable to a local combination 
function. Attempting to generate behavior consistent with complex dependency 
within a modular updating scheme is an unreasonable pursuit of "something for 
nothing" behavior (Horvitz and Heckerman [45]). Thus, we cannot capture 
information about arbitrary dependencies with simple scalar functions. 
The modular evidence combination and belief-updating schemes must make 
some default assumptions about dependency among pieces of evidence updating 
the same hypothesis. Henrion [51] has demonstrated that any rule-based scheme 
for uncertain inference with local updating must make some general assumption 
about dependence among these convergent lines of evidence. The assumption of 
conditional independence by modular schemes based on the likelihood ratio 
defines only one set of such assumptions. It is possible to have modular 
combination functions that dictate more complex default assumptions about 
patterns of dependency. This is a current area of investigation (Heckerman 
[521). 
In summary, like the early probabilistic systems, the popular rule-based 
method imposes strong restrictions on the kinds of dependence that can be 
represented effectively. Unlike the explicit assumptions of the simplified 
probabilistic systems, the restrictive assumptions in the heuristic approaches 
have been less apparent. One might argue that the implicit nature of the 
assumptions in rule-based systems has tended to promote a dangerous "myth of 
modularity" among uncertain propositions: Rule-based approaches, like the 
simple probabilistic approaches, do not have the expressiveness necessary to 
represent coherently the relationships among uncertain beliefs. 
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Robustness of the Heuristic Approaches 
A common response to criticisms of the assumptions embodied in the heuristic 
approaches to reasoning under uncertainty is that the choice of uncertainty 
calculus and assumptions i  not important in the performance of real systems. 
Indeed, Mycin and Internist-1 perform at the expert level despite the identified 
inconsistencies. A formal study by Cooper and Clancey demonstrated that 
Mycin was fairly insensitive to the precision of the numbers used for certainty 
factors (Buchanan and Shortliffe [44]). This view is buttressed by the findings, 
as we mentioned, that the early probabilistic expert systems performed well 
(often better than human experts) despite their simplifying assumption. 
It is dangerous, however, to generalize from these results. The Mycin domain 
is relatively forgiving; for example, the use of wide-spectrum antibiotics to 
"cover" several eading hypotheses means that misdiagnosis of the infecting 
organism does not necessarily ead to inadequate reatment. Careful examination 
of the results of a comparison of CFs with probabilistic inference presented in 
the original paper on CFs (Shortliffe [53]) shows that, on average, the CF 
system underresponded to the diagnosticity of the data by a factor of 2 (Wise 
[54], Henrion [51]). In 25% of the cases, it actually responded to the wrong 
direction, interpreting evidence that overall supported a conclusion to be 
disconfirming, or vice versa. 
Investigators have identified that inappropriate assumptions of conditional 
independence in simplified Bayesian systems can lead to noticeable degradation 
of performance. Norusis found significant improvement in the performance ofa 
medical diagnostic system as the number of dependencies xplicitly represented 
was increased (Norusis and Jacquez [55]). Fryback discovered that problems 
with assuming conditional independence an grow as the number of variables 
represented in a diagnostic model are increased; that is, the potential benefits of 
considering a larger number of variables can be overwhelmed by the 
proportional increases in the number of missing dependencies (Fryback [56]). 
Wise experimentally compared the performance of six common uncertain 
inference schemes for small rule sets and found that differences in performance 
between heuristic and probabilistic schemes depend heavily on the situation 
(Wise [54]). As we might expect, when there was strong evidence in one 
direction, most schemes performed well. But when the evidence was weak or 
conflicting, heuristic schemes tended to perform poorly, and in some cases did 
no better than random. Problems with the use of certainty factors within early 
Pathfinder research ave been noted. Inaccuracies in the diagnoses noted with 
the application of certainty factors to combine vidence were diminished with a 
move to a probabilistic ombination scheme (Heckerman [57]). 
Thus, we should not conclude from the apparent robustness of the 
performance in a forgiving domain that handling of uncertainty makes little 
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difference in other applications. In particular, in models where expensive 
information-acquisition decisions typically are required to reduce uncertainty, 
the inappropriate handling of uncertainty may lead to costly decisions. The 
sensitivity of a system's performance to inconsistency, to assumptions of 
modularity, or to the use of inaccurate measures of belief will depend to a great 
extent on the task. In some cases, the inconsistencies and assumptions can lead to 
costly error (Horvitz and Heckerman [45], Henrion [51]). 
Buchanan and Shortliffe, the creators of the certainty-factor model, have 
warned against uncritical application of the certainty-factor calculus to other 
domains [44]. However, there has been relatively little discussion about the 
applicability of these warnings in the popularity of expert systems employing 
certainty factors (i.e., the widely used derivatives of the Emycin shell) and 
similar heuristic schemes. Further theoretical and experimental studies of the 
sensitivity of inference schemes to different assumptions and errors in situations 
of weak or conflicting evidence in real-world problem solving are required to 
understand the costs associated with the use of different heuristic methods. 
Toward More Expressive Representations 
In summary, early schemes using simplified probabilistic representations and 
inference often have been successful in terms of performance r lative to that of 
human experts in small domain areas. The systems, however, have not been 
widely adopted for a variety of reasons, including their apparently unrealistic 
assumptions and their inability to represent the range of qualitative knowledge 
available to the expert. Originally, AI techniques were applied to the 
development of expert systems with the hope that they might avoid such 
arbitrary assumptions and incorporate a richer range of qualitative knowledge 
with smaller engineering costs. However, recent work has shown that many 
well-known AI approaches for representing and reasoning about uncertain 
knowledge also have made strong assumptions about both prior probabilities and 
modularity. 
CURRENT RESEARCH ON DECISION THEORY IN EXPERT 
SYSTEMS 
As we have seen, there have been justified criticisms of the restrictive 
assumptions of both the simplified probabilistic schemes and several heuristic 
approaches touncertain i ference. In recent work, researchers have attempted to
develop richer knowledge representations that are based in a principled way on 
probability and decision theory and yet are capable of expressing, in a flexible 
and tractable manner, a wider range of both qualitative and quantitative 
knowledge. Much of this work has centered on the use of graphs or networks to 
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represent uncertain relationships, including belief networks and influence 
diagrams. These representations can facilitate assessment of coherent prior 
distributions, make assumptions explicit, and allow assumptions to be manipu- 
lated easily by knowledge ngineers and experts. 
In this section, we review the basic ideas on which these knowledge 
representation schemes are based and survey current methods for using them in 
decision-theoretic expert systems. We examine knowledge ngineering, the 
process of encoding expert knowledge, using these schemes. We present 
various classes of inference techniques that use these representations for 
propagating evidence and finding optimal decisions. Finally, we review research 
on explaining the results of decision-theoretic inference. 
Knowledge Representation for Decision-Theoretic Problems 
Howard has called the complete model of a decision problem the decision 
basis (Howard and Matheson [26]). A comprehensive d cision basis consists of 
components hat represent the alternatives, tates, preferences, and relationships 
in a decision situation. Decisions are the alternative courses of action available 
to the decision maker. The alternative states of the world are those factors or 
variables that will be explicitly represented in the model, and the range of values 
that are considered reasonable or possible. The preferences of the decision 
maker are represented asa ranking in terms of the various possible outcomes. 
The preference information embodies which factors in a decision situation that 
are important in judging the desirability of alternative outcomes, as well as how 
to make tradeoffs among dimensions of outcomes. As we mentioned earlier, AI 
systems have not directly addressed explicit representation f knowledge about 
preferences. The final component of a decision basis is the set of relationships 
among states of the world, decisions and preferences. In general, these 
relationships can be expressed logically, probabilistically, or qualitatively. 
A variety of representations for a decision basis have been developed in the 
decision sciences. These representations i clude joint probability distributions 
over variables coupled with a loss function (as used in probability and statistics), 
and decision trees, which evolved with the development of decision analysis 
(Raiffa [25]). Although these representations are useful and general, they do not 
provide a perspicuous means of representing independence in a manner 
accessible to both human and machine reasoners. Influence diagrams and belief 
networks were designed with precisely these objectives in mind. 
INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS AND BELIEF NETWORKS The influence diagram is a 
graphical knowledge-representation language that represents he decision basis 
(Howard and Matheson [58], Owens [59], Olmsted [60]). The influence diagram 
is an acyclic directed graph containing nodes representing propositions or 
quantities of interest (i.e., alternatives, tates) and arcs representing interactions 
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Figure 1. An Influence Diagram Describing the Decisions That a Patient with Heart 
Disease Might Face. (Dependencies (arcs) link propositions (nodes) that represent s ates 
of information (circles), decisions (squares), and patient value (diamond). 
between the nodes. Nodes representing propositions are associated with a set of 
mutually exclusive and exhaustive values that represent alternative possible 
states. The arcs represent deterministic, probabilistic, or informational 
relationships between odes. 
Influence diagrams formally describe a decision basis, yet have a 
human-oriented qualitative structure that facilitates knowledge acquisition and 
communication. An influence diagram for a medical decision problem is shown 
in Figure 1. The diagram encodes a decision problem about whether to 
undertake coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery. The danger in this 
situation is the risk of myocardial infarction (MI) (i.e., heart attack). 
The example demonstrates the four different kinds of nodes in an influence 
diagram. Decision nodes represent the possible actions available to a decision 
maker. They are the variables in an influence diagram under the direct control of 
a decision-making a ent. These nodes are portrayed as rectangles in influence 
diagrams. Two decisions are depicted in the example: The Angiogram Test node 
refers to an artery-imaging procedure that provides information about he extent 
of Coronary Artery Disease in the patient. Heart Surgery refers to a decision to 
undertake a CABG surgical procedure. The decisions are whether to undertake 
none, one, or both of the procedures. 
The arcs into a decision node indicate what information is available (i.e., 
values of uncertain variables or previous decisions that have been resolved) at 
the time the choice is made. The diagram indicates that, when he makes the 
surgery decision, the decision maker will know the outcome of the angiogram 
test if it was performed. 
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Chance nodes represent states of the world that are uncertain. We depict 
chance nodes as circles or ovals. There are two kinds of chance nodes: 
stochastic and deterministic (the latter are portrayed as double-lined circles). 
The belief associated with a stochastic hance node is a probabilistic function of 
the outcomes of its predecessor nodes. For example, the probability distribution 
over the values of Life Years (i.e., years of life remaining) depends on whether 
heart surgery was performed (because there is a risk of death from the surgery 
itself) and the reduced risk of a future fatal heart attack if the operation is 
successful. The value of a deterministic node is a logical function of the 
outcomes of its predecessor nodes. In this example, we are assuming there is a 
deterministic function yielding costs based on the monetary expense of the 
angiogram test, the surgical procedure, and the hospitalization following a heart 
attack. A deterministic chance node is a special case of a stochastic chance node: 
The probability distribution is an impulse on a particular value, because the 
values of the predecessors determine the node's value with certainty. 
Finally, value nodes capture the preferences of a decision maker.These nodes 
are depicted as diamonds. The predecessors to the value node indicate those 
outcomes or attributes that are included in the evaluation of a choice or plan. For 
the heart disease xample, the attributes are life quality, life years, and cost. The 
graph shows that the quality of life is influenced by the chest pain at a particular 
level of exertion and the morbidity of surgery. The value function (a real-valued 
scalar function) encapsulates trade-offs among these various outcomes for an 
individual patient, as well as individual preferences about risk and time. 
Much of the research on representation a d inference with these graphical 
representations has focused on specializations of influence diagrams that contain 
only chance nodes (Rousseau [61], Howard and Matheson [58], Lemmer [62], 
Cooper [63], Pearl and Verma [64], Kim and Pearl [65]). These express 
probabilistic relationships among states of the world exclusively, without 
explicit consideration of decisions and values. Several different erms are used 
for these representations, including causal networks, Bayesian nets, and belief 
networks (Pearl [66]). We use belief networks, as this term is the most popular. 
THREE LEVELS OF REPRESENTATION The expressiveness and sufficiency of 
influence diagrams is based in the representation's three levels of specification: 
relation, function, and number (Howard and Matheson [58]). We can express 
relations at one level without explicitly referring to more specific levels. 
The relation level captures the qualitative structure of the problem as 
expressed in the topology of the network. At this level, the arcs and nodes 
describe dependencies between the values of propositions or variables (nodes). 
Influence diagrams at the level of relation are similar to several common 
representations in modeling and in AI research, such as semantic nets. Each 
variable in an influence diagram is associated with a set of mutually exclusive 
and collectively exhaustive values (values for each node are not pictured in 
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Figure 1). For example, the node Chest Pain in our example is characterized by
values of none, mild discomfort, and crushing sensation in response to a 
particular level of exertion. Coronary Artery Disease is characterized bynone, 
single-vessel, two-vessel, and three-vessel, describing the number of arteries in 
the heart hat are diseased. It is important that the outcomes of each node in the 
diagram be defined unambiguously. In the example, the arc between the 
Coronary Artery Disease and Chest Pain nodes expresses knowledge about he 
existence of a dependency between the values that coronary artery disease and 
chest pain may take on. 
At the level of function, the functional form of the relationships among nodes 
is specified. For instance, the form of the conditional probability relating the 
outcome (value) of Coronary Artery Disease to the probability distribution over 
the values of Chest Pain is specified. 
Finally, at the level of number, we specify numerical values that are operated 
on by the functional forms. This level represents he quantitative details of the 
dependence of each variable on its parents (the nodes that influence the 
variable). 
An uncertain influence is represented by the conditional probability 
distribution for a variable given the values of its parents. As an example, at the 
level of number, we might specify that p(chest pain = mild 
discomfortlcoronary artery disease = one vessel) = 0.25. Chance nodes 
without predecessors are specified at the level of number with unconditional or 
prior probability distributions. 
CONDITIONAL INDEPENDENCE Independence usually is defined as a quan- 
titative relation among probabilities--for example, as satisfaction of the product 
rule--expressed here in terms of marginal distributions. 
p(x, yl~)=p(xl~)p(yl~) 
However, we also may express independence with the following, more 
qualitative relationship, expressing that belief in proposition x is not affected by 
knowledge of the truth of proposition y, given background information ~: 
P(xlY, ~) =P(Xl~) 
A belief network expresses independence graphically. The arcs in a belief 
network, and more precisely the lack of arcs among variables, are qualitative 
expressions of probabilistic independence of various kinds. In particular, source 
variables (i.e., those variables with no predecessors or directed pathway 
between them) are marginally independent. Variables u and w in Figure 2 are 
marginally independent of each other. Where two variables have one or more 
common parents but no arc between them, they are conditionally independent of
each other given their common parent(s). In Figure 2, variables v and x are 
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Figure 2. A Simple Belief Network Demonstrating Conditional Independence Among 
Propositions 
conditionally independent of each other given w. Finally, a node is conditionally 
independent of its indirect predecessors (i.e., nodes at a minimal directed path of 
distance greater than 1) given all of the variable's immediate predecessors (i.e., 
those nodes from which it receives an arc direcdy). For example, in Figure 2, 
variable y is conditionally independent of u and w, given o and x. 
At the numerical level, we assign marginal probability distributions to source 
variables (w and u in the example) and conditional probability distributions to all 
other variables given their immediate predecessors. We can compute the joint 
distribution over all the uncertain variables in a belief network simply as the 
product of all these marginal and conditional distributions: 
p(u, v, w, x, y[~)=p(ylv,  x, ~)p(vlu, w, ~)p(x{w, ~)p(wl~)p(ulO 
Provided that the influence diagram has no directed cycles, the probability 
distributions assigned in this way are guaranteed tobe complete (that is, to have 
no unspecified parameters) and consistent ( hat is, to contain no conflicts). In 
this way the belief network provides a simple solution to the problem that was 
unsolved in Prospector and related systems--namely, how to assign probabilities 
to variables and links without creating incoherence. 
The influence diagram representation grants knowledge engineers the 
freedom to define and manipulate dependencies--or, more important, indepen- 
dencies. The representation allows engineers to explicitly control modularity 
assumptions. The independencies in an influence diagram are a formal 
expression of the locality of effect of variables. The effects of one variable on a 
distant one can propagate only along the influence arcs. More precisely, a 
variable is screened from the effects of distant variables (is conditionally 
independent of them) given its Markov blanket; that is, given its direct 
predecessors, direct successors, and the direct predecessors of these successors 
(i.e., parents, children, and spouses). The presence of arcs explicitly defines 
possible dependence r lations among the nodes in the graph. 5 
We can now interpret more carefully the heart surgery influence diagram 
5 An arc at the level of relation i dicates only the possibility of dependence; at the detailed number 
level, it may turn out that he probability distribution is actually independent of its predecessors. 
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(Figure 1) in terms of conditional independence. In the diagram, the primary 
expression of conditional independence involves coronary artery disease and its 
effects. The diagram asserts that the probabilities over the values of Chest Pain 
(both current and future), the values of Angiogram Test, and the values of MI 
are all dependent on the value of Coronary Artery Disease. Furthermore, given 
knowledge of Coronary Artery Disease, these effects of the disease are 
conditionally independent of one another. Once we know the precise xtent of a 
patient's heart disease, then presence of chest pain does not change our belief 
that he might have a heart attack at some time in the future. The knowledge of 
coronary artery disease as the causal agent ells us all the information available 
about he interaction of its effects. 
For diagnostic reasoning and decision making, however, we might wish to 
reason backward; that is, we may wish to infer the probability of MI, given a 
specified egree of chest pain. As we mentioned earlier, the primary mechanism 
for this type of deductive inference is Bayes' theorem. Later in this section we 
describe inference techniques that work with influence diagrams and belief 
networks to provide this type of reasoning. 
Knowledge Engineering for Decision-Theoretic Systems 
Knowledge ngineering is the process by which expert knowledge isobtained, 
developed, modified, codified, and installed in computer-based diagnostic and 
decision-making systems. Although the term knowledge engineering has not 
been used traditionally in the field of decision analysis, the fundamental 
activities of a decision analyst and a knowledge ngineer are similar. Both work 
with a decision maker or a domain expert o construct a formal representation f 
knowledge. The knowledge ngineer uses rule-based or object-based representa- 
tions, typically coupling them with some type of deductive inference method, 
whereas the decision analyst constructs influence diagrams or decision trees for 
use with decision-theoretic inference methods. 6 
The core of decision-analytic knowledge ngineering is the construction of an 
informative, credible, and computable decision basis (Holtzman and Breese 
[67], Breese [68]). As we have seen, influence diagrams reduce the complexity 
of assessing influences by allowing explicit graphical representation of 
dependencies and independencies. The diagram itself, therefore, is an important 
tool in knowledge ngineering, as well as in computation. 
In most current applications of influence diagrams and belief networks in 
expert systems, the model is constructed as part of the knowledge ngineering 
process and is then used during consultation (Henrion and Cooley [67], Ben- 
Bassat et al. [70], Horvitz et al. [71]), We expect hat, over time, additional 
6 See Henrion and Cooley [66] for an experimental comparison f rule-based and decision-analytic 
paradigms for knowledge engineering. 
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components of knowledge engineering decision-theoretic systems will be 
automated. 
In the remainder of this section, we briefly review some of the fundamental 
issues in engineering decision-theoretic systems. Our primary objective is to 
provide a pointer to literature that addresses these issues in more detail. 
IDENTIFYING DECISIONS AND GENERATING ALTERNATIVES The set of 
decision alternatives has a tremendous effect on the overall value of an expert 
consultation. A new alternative often is worth more than extensive reasoning and 
analysis. The generation of new alternatives i a synthetic activity focusing on 
constructing actions or sequences of actions that achieve certain goals. Little 
research has been done on the knowledge-based generation of decision 
alternatives. 
There has been work on the problem of dealing with the explosion of decision 
sequences that occurs when a series of decisions is possible and each decision 
has several alternatives. The technique of strategy tables, from decision 
analysis, involves selecting several representative strategies from the full 
combinatoric set of possible sequences (McNamee and Celona [72]). Each 
strategy consists of a sequence of decisions that are synergistic, or internally 
consistent. The strategies then are treated as the alternatives in the decision 
analysis Langlotz and colleagues [73] propose a similar method and use heuristic 
search to generate a reduced set of possible medical therapy plans for detailed 
decision analysis. 
VALUE STRUCTURING AND PREFERENCE ENCODING AI investigators, to 
date, have placed little emphasis on the preferences ordesires of decision makers 
or reasoning agents. Decision theorists have been studying preference in a 
subfield of decision analysis that emphasizes multiattribute decision problems 
(Von Winterfeldt and Edwards [27], Keeney and Raiffa [28]). A 
decision-theoretic analysis is driven in large part by the attributes that are 
important to the decision maker (life duration, life quality, and monetary cost in 
the heart surgery example) and by the manner in which these attributes are 
combined in assigning value to alternative outcomes. Von Winterfeldt and 
Edwards [27] and Keeney and Raiffa [28] present numerous theoretical results 
on multiattribute value issues and discuss elicitation procedures for assessing the 
complex preference structures in terms of individual attributes. 
An additional important component of preference is the encoding of the 
decision maker's attitude toward risk. Utility theory deals directly with attitudes 
toward alternatives that have uncertain outcomes. A substantial literature 
addresses the theoretical nd practical aspects of risk-preference encoding (Von 
Winterfeldt and Edwards [27], Keeney and Raiffa [28], Howard [21], Sarin 
[74], Keeney [75], Buede [76]). Most techniques involve asking the decision 
maker about her or his preferences for various hypothetical gambles and then 
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combining the results and checking for consistency. Several researchers have 
examined computer aids for value structuring and preference modeling 
(WeUman [77], Holtzman [78]). 
ENCODING PROBABILITIES One of the central tasks in engineering a 
decision-theoretic system is that of assessing probabilities. A frequent concern is 
the availability of probabilities as well as the numbers of probabilities that may 
be required. From a subjectivist viewpoint, it is possible in principle for anyone 
to assess a probability for any event, no matter how little he knows about it. 
After all, assessing a probability distribution is a way to express how little or 
much a person knows about something. 
Nonetheless, expressing human knowledge in terms of probabilities is a 
demanding task. Researchers of human judgment under uncertainty have 
identified a set of biases and heuristics that tend to distort human decision 
making and judgments about uncertain events (Kahneman et al. [22]). Such 
biases tend to narrow or skew assessed probability distributions, and 
interviewing methods emphasize making implicit assumptions explicit and 
encouraging the subject o consider a full range of information and possibilities. 
Decision analysts have drawn on this research, as well as on professional 
practice, to develop methods to mitigate the effects of these biases (Spetzler and 
Stael von Holstein [79]). 
Once we have specified a general dependency structure for a set of 
probabilistic relationships, we can quantify the influences as conditional and 
marginal probability distributions. The conditional distribution p(Xil Y1, Y2, 
" " ,  Yn, ~) in general requires 2 n parameters for binary X and Y~. Figure 3 
shows the conditional assessment task posed in terms of E, some observable 
output or evidence, and a set of inputs or hypotheses HI, //2, • • ", H~. 
We mentioned earlier that there has been recent work on the use of functions 
that specify patterns of independence. Recently, investigators have suggested 
methods for streamlining the probability assessment task, by specifying such 
prototypical functions for the probability distributions (Heckerman [52], 
Henrion [80], Pearl [66]). One example of a prototypical independence structure 
is termed the noisy-OR gate. We review this structure as an example of the 
assessment savings that can be gained through the identification of similar 
patterns of independence. 
The noisy-OR form is a probabilistic generalization of a standard Boolean 
OR. With a Boolean OR, any single one of a number of input signals being true 
is sufficient o induce a true value for the output. In a noisy-OR, each input 
signal has some probability of being sufficient to cause the output; the processes 
that prevent the signal from being sufficient are independent. This structure has 
been found to be representative of many real-world probabilistic relationships as 
well as an efficient representation f probability information. 
The noisy-OR relationship allows the full conditional distribution to be 
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The Noisy-OR Prototypical Dependency Structure Figure 3. 
derived from the individual probabilities of the evidence given each of the 
hypotheses and so requires only n parameters (Good [81], Pearl [66]). The basis 
for this savings is straightforward. Suppose that Pi is P(EI only Hi, ~)--that is, 
the probability of E given that only Hi occurs. Then the probability of E given 
that all the Hi occur is 
P(EIH~, 1-12, "",  H,, ~)= 1 -1~I (1 -Pi) 
i=1  
Researchers are seeking techniques for explicitly acquiring and representing 
several forms of independence. One means of identifying and assessing 
conditional probabilities in a perspicuous fashion is an attention-focusing 
technique called similarity networks (Heckerman [52]). A similarity network is 
a method for identifying sets of evidence that can disambiguate b tween pairs of 
hypotheses. The graphical display of these relationships indicates constraints on 
the conditional probability relationships between hypotheses and evidence. 
Decision analysts have developed various techniques for eliciting numerical 
probabilities (Spetzler and Stael von Holstein [79], Lichtenstein et al. [82]). 
Some of these assessment techniques ask directly for probabilities, whereas 
others seek specific values of a variable while holding the probability fixed. A 
popular method uses a probability wheel, a simple graphical tool consisting of a 
disk with two adjustable complementary sectors of different colors. The size of 
one colored sector can be adjusted to correspond to the probability to be 
assessed, as a way of expressing a probability without explicitly mentioning a 
number. For extremely low or high probabilities, techniques that use odds or 
log-odds have been shown to be useful (Von Winterfeldt and Edwards [27]). 
This discussion of probabilities brings up the issue of the completeness of
probability assessment. There is always a trade-off between assigning a 
probability based on a current state of understanding and expending additional 
effort in modeling and introspection to come up with a better estimate (Good 
[83], Logan [84]). And, in practice, the assessor of a probability often is 
uncertain and uncomfortable about he distribution he is providing. Of course, 
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the probability distribution that we would assess given additional time or effort is 
an uncertain quantity, and there is no fundamental barrier to using a probabilistic 
representation to represent this uncertainty (i.e., a second-order probability) 
(Good [83], Heckerman and Jimison [85]). However, uncertainty about 
probabilities often masks the existence of other conditioning events for which the 
distribution is considered stable. It is the task of the knowledge ngineer to draw 
out those conditioning events and thereby to extend the model [also referred to as 
extending the conversation (Tribus [86])] to account for the uncertainty in 
assessment. 
MODEL REFINEMENT AND SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS The scope and detail of a 
decision model are central to determining the ultimate usefulness of an analysis. 
It may seem best to include all relevant factors in the analysis, in order to make 
the model as accurate and realistic as possible. In medicine, for example, 
variables related to family history, physical activity, diet, and life style may all 
be related to a decision regarding whether or not to proceed with a surgical 
procedure. However, as we noted, no model is complete, and inclusion of 
additional relevant variables can rapidly overwhelm our ability to solve, 
interpret, and explain the model. 
Therefore, there is a trade-off between the benefits of complete, detailed 
models and those of simplified, more computable models. In decision-theoretic 
knowledge ngineering, we refer to the process of alternatively expanding or 
contracting the model as completeness modulation (Horvitz [87], Holtzman 
[78]). An attempt is made to produce a model that includes those variables that 
are most important to a particular set of decisions, in terms of having major 
influence on the recommendations developed by the model. 
Sensitivity analysis is used to determine which parameters, uncertainties, and 
assumptions have the most influence on the behavior and recommendations of a 
model. It involves exploring the space of possible models in order to build a 
model that is simultaneously informative and tractable. Typically, this 
information is used to limit effort on construction and refinement of the model. 
There are several classes of sensitivity analysis that are appropriate at various 
junctures in the process of building a decision model (Howard [88, 89]). 
Sensitivity to risk tolerance, discretization, and uncertainty are routinely 
performed as part of a professional decision analysis. Since the probabilistic 
representation of a variable exacts costs in elicitation, representation, and 
inference, it is desirable to include only those uncertainties that matter. Henrion 
introduces the expected value of including uncertainty (EVIU) as a sensitivity 
measure of the importance of uncertainty [90]. 
To date, few people have investigated the automation of sensitivity analysis 
for probabilistic reasoning. A promising area in this regard is error analysis, the 
notion of determining the extent o which errors in inputs and assumptions, uch 
as assessed probabilities, affect ultimate conclusions in decision-theoretic 
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models (Henrion [51]). Note that sensitivity is defined with respect to values and 
decisions and provides insight about he important components of a model. As 
AI applications seek to deal with ever larger knowledge bases, it will become 
increasingly important to use the individual decision-making context to develop 
tractable methods for reasoning. 
Inference with Belief Networks and Influence Diagrams 
Once we have constructed a belief network or influence diagram at the level of 
relation, and have assessed the details of the probabilistic dependencies at the 
level of number, we can perform inference about how changes in the belief of 
one or more propositions will change the belief in other propositions. There are 
several categories of inference. We may wish to compute the marginal 
probability distribution for a variable. For example, we may want to determine 
the probability of MI (heart attack) for a specific patient (see Figure 1). We may 
wish to compute the updated probability distributions over a variable--for 
example, the probability of different values of Coronary Artery Disease given 
the truth of a value of a related variable (e.g., Chest Pain = none; Angiogram 
= negative). Finally, we may wish to select he best decision. In the sample 
influence diagram, we wish to decide whether to perform an angiogram and 
whether to operate, given the available information. 
Unlike inference with a rule-based inference net, belief networks and 
influence diagrams allow inference in a direction opposite to the direction in 
which the influence was assessed. Consequently, it is possible to propagate the 
effect of observing any set of variables on the probability distribution of any 
other variable or function of variables. 
In the next three sections, we discuss algorithms for probabilistic inference in 
belief networks. We consider exact and approximate methods. Finally, we 
consider decision making with the influence-diagram representation. 
BRUTE-FORCE PROBABILISTIC INFERENCE As we have shown, a belief 
network with probabilities assigned to all source nodes and influences specifies a
complete joint probability distribution over the variables in the network. We can 
generate this joint distribution simply by taking the product of all of these 
assigned distributions. Given a joint distribution, it is straightforward to 
compute the marginal probability for any value of a variable or Boolean 
combination of values, by summing over the relevant dimensions of the joint 
distribution. Similarly, the conditional probability p(xl e, ~) for any value of x, 
given evidence , can be calculated as the ratio p(x, el ~)/p(el ~). Unfortunately, 
the size of the joint distribution is exponential in the number of variables. 
Although this approach is conceptually simple, it requires computational effort 
that is exponential in the number of variables and is thus impractical for 
problems with more than a handful of variables. 
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EXACT METHODS A key to computational efficiency for inference in belief 
networks is the exploitation of specified independence r lations to avoid having 
to calculate xplicitly the full joint probability distribution. A variety of methods 
have been developed, each focusing on particular families of belief-network 
topology. 
Kim and Pearl [65] have developed a distributed algorithm for solving singly 
connected networks, or polytrees. The algorithm is linear in the number of 
variables in the network. In this scheme, each node in the network obtains 
messages from each of its parent and child nodes, representing all the evidence 
available from alternative portions of the network. The single-connectedness 
guarantees that the information i  each message is independent and that a scalar 
is sufficient to represent the total information from each linked node (if nodes are 
logical). Each time a new observation is made, messages are propagated 
throughout the network to update the probabilities associated with the other 
variables. 
Unfortunately, most real networks are multiply connected, so more complex 
methods are required. One approach, developed by Shachter [91], allows 
computation ofthe conditional probability distribution for any function f ,  of a set 
of variables X, given evidence E, as 19 (f(X)[E, ~). This algorithm focuses on a 
single function of variables rather than on updating the probability of all nodes 
given evidence. It applies a sequence of operators to the network to reverse the 
links, using Bayes' theorem, and sums over nodes to eliminate them. The 
process continues until only the node representing the original probabilistic 
query remains. Shachter's algorithm will work with multiply connected 
networks but requires detailed knowledge of the topology to operate. The 
Shachter algorithm can be significantly more efficient than the brute-force 
approach of computing the complete joint probability distribution. The extent of 
the efficiency gains depends on the topology of the network. 
Other exact approaches rely on manipulating multiply connected networks to 
reduce them to singly connected networks (Pearl [66]). The Kim and Pearl 
algorithm or similar methods can then be applied to the network. Instantiation of 
nodes within a loop can effectively break the loop; thus Pearl [66] has suggested 
focusing on determining the minimal cutsets of nodes that could be instantiated 
to eliminate loops. These nodes must be instantiated with each possible value (or 
combination of values). The resulting probabilities are averaged over the results 
from each instantiation, weighted by the prior probabilities of the instantiated 
variables. 
Lauritzen and Spiegelhalter suggest a different approach based on a 
reformulation of the belief network [92]. First they "moralize" the graph by 
adding arcs between all pairs of nodes that have a common successor (i.e., 
parents with a common child). They then triangulate it, adding arcs so that there 
are no undirected cycles of more than three nodes without an internal chord. 
Then they identify all the cliques--that is, all maximal sets of nodes that are 
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completely interconnected. They show that, by this transformation, any network 
can be converted into a corresponding singly connected network of cliques. 
They provide an algorithm for propagation of evidence within this tree of 
cliques, which is somewhat analogous to the propagation of belief in a singly 
connected network of variables. 
The computational complexity of these algorithms has not been completely 
analyzed in terms of the topology of the network. However, all of the algorithms 
are liable to tractability problems if there are many intersecting loops in the 
network. For example, in the approach of Lauritzen and Speigelhalter, the joint 
distribution for each clique must be represented xplicitly; thus, the algorithm is 
exponential in the size of the largest clique. That clique can be very large in a 
network with many intersecting loops. 
More generally, Cooper [93] has shown recently that the general problem of 
inference in a belief network is NP-hard, so we should not expect o find an 
exact method that is computationally efficient for arbitrary networks. 
Nevertheless, exact methods for the tractable solution of specific classes of 
belief networks may be possible. 
STOCHASTIC METHODS Researchers have developed various approaches that 
employ approximation methods; Cooper's result on NP-hardness of exact 
probabilistic inference suggests that approximate approaches frequently may be 
more productive than exact approaches for many cases. One approach, 
stochastic simulation, isattractive because it represents he probabilistic problem 
as a sample of deterministic, logical cases and reduces the probabilistic 
representation to a simpler, and perhaps more transparent, logical 
representation. The accuracy of the representation depends on the sample size or 
on the number of simulation cycles. We can use standard statistical techniques to
estimate the error in the approximation from a given sample size, and we can 
reduce the uncertainty o an arbitrary degree by increasing the sample size. 
Bundy [94] suggested a Monte Carlo sampling approach for computing the 
probabilities of Boolean combinations of correlated logical variables, which he 
calls the incidence calculus. Henrion [95] developed an extension of this 
approach for inference in belief networks, termed probabilistic logic sampling. 
In this approach, a belief network is approximately represented by a sample of 
deterministic cases. For each case or simulation run, each source and entry of 
conditional probability arcs is randomly generated as a truth value or as a logical 
implication rule using the specified probabilities. Diagnostic inference is 
performed by estimating the probability of a hypothesis as the fraction of 
simulations that give rise to the observed set of evidence. This method is linear 
in the number of nodes in the network, regardless of the degree of 
interconnectedness of cycles. Unfortunately, it is exponential in the number of 
pieces of evidence observed. 
Chin and Cooper [96] have used the logic-sampling approach to generate 
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samples of medical cases for simulation purposes. They avoid the exponential 
nature of the general problem by rearranging the direction of the links in the 
network using Shachter's algorithm, so that all observed variables are inputs 
(sources) to the network. Unfortunately, this is not a general solution to the 
problem, because the rearrangement is liable to exponential complexity for 
highly interconnected networks. 
Pearl [97] has developed a stochastic-sampling scheme that involves direct 
propagation i both directions along each influence, rather than solely through 
the encoded irection, as in logic sampling. In this method, the conditional 
probability distribution is computed for each node given all the neighbors in its 
Markov blanket. First, all the nodes are initialized with random truth values. 
During simulation, the truth value of a node is updated according to the values of 
that node's neighbors when the node fires. The node's new truth value is 
generated at random using the conditional probability for that node given the 
state of all its neighbors. The probability of each node is estimated as the fraction 
of simulation cycles for which it is true. 
A merit of the Pearl approach is that it could be implemented asa network of 
parallel-distributed processors, each operating independently, receiving 
messages from its neighbors and sending messages to them. Unfortunately, as 
Chin and Cooper demonstrated [96], simulation approaches are liable to 
convergence problems when the network contains probabilities that are close to 
0 or 1. Unlike in the logic-sampling approach, successive cycles are not 
independent, and the network can get trapped in a state from which it takes many 
cycles to escape. It remains to be seen whether there are techniques for avoiding 
this problem. 
BOUNDING METHODS As we discussed under "The Problem of Diagnosis," 
when multiple disorders or faults are possible in a diagnostic problem, the 
total number of diagnoses is exponential in the number of hypotheses. To 
compute the exact posterior probability of any diagnoses, p(DIE, ,~), we must 
compute 
P(EI~)= ~ P(EIDi, ~)P(Dil~) 
D i E 2 H 
in the denominator f Bayes' theorem, which involves the exponential task of 
summing over all the diagnoses. However, computation of the ratio of the 
probabilities of any two diagnoses is much simpler, because the p(El~) in the 
denominator f each cancels out and so does not need to be computed. That is, 
p(D~IE, ~) p(D~l~)P(ElD~, ) 
p(D21 E, ,~) p(D21,~)p(EID2, ~:)
Cooper [63] and Peng [98] describe branch-and-bound methods for searching 
through the space of possible diagnoses, which can identify the most probable 
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diagnoses without examining all possible ones. These methods are able to prune 
the search by eliminating all extensions of a diagnosis that are provably less 
probable than the current best, and so can be a great deal more efficient han the 
exhaustive methods. The Peng method is more efficient but works only for two- 
level belief networks consisting of a set of faults (level 1) and a set of evidence 
(level 2), with the only arcs being from faults or disorders to evidence. In this 
method, the effects of multiple disorders are combined with noisy-OR gates, 
described earlier. 
Bounding methods can be used to compute bounds on the absolute probability 
for any diagnosis. They sometimes allow us to identify the most probable n 
diagnosis in a set D without calculating over the total joint probability space. 
For example, the partial sum ofp(Dil4)p(EIDi, 4) gives a lower bound on 
p(EI 4). Cooper [63] showed how to use this approach to compute upper bounds 
for absolute posterior probabilities as well. He also gave a related method for 
computing lower bounds. 
INFERENCE WITHIN INFLUENCE DIAGRAMS So far, we have focused on 
inference in belief networks. With influence diagrams, we also must consider 
the question of how to find the best decision strategy, or decisions that will 
maximize our expected utility given the available information. Not all influence 
diagrams represent a well-defined ecision problem; those that do are termed 
decision etworks. A decision network must have at least one value node and a 
well-ordered path through all its decision nodes. That is, each decision node 
must directly precede and directly influence successor decision nodes. 
Furthermore, immediate predecessors of a decision node must be immediate 
predecessors of all subsequent decisions. This constraint (referred to as the 
no-forgetting condition) ensures that all information available for a decision is 
also available for subsequent decisions. 
The most popular epresentation for finding an optimal decision strategy is the 
use of a decision tree. In a decision tree, each terminal node represents a
particular scenario or combination of values for all the uncertain and decision 
variables. The standard roll-back method to evaluate a decision tree is to 
compute the utility for each terminal node. This methods computes the expected 
utility over the branches at each outcome variable and the maximum expected 
utility over the alternatives ateach decision. In the worst case, this algorithm is 
exponential in the number of outcome and decision variables. However, there is 
no need to follow branches with zero probability or decisions that are 
unavailable, and so the effort may be much smaller in highly asymmetric trees. 
A decision network can always be converted into its corresponding decision 
tree, but this is not necessarily the best way to analyze it. Olmsted [60] and 
Shachter [99] have developed techniques for operating directly on influence 
diagrams. The algorithms apply a sequence of operations to the diagram, 
successively eliminating nodes when their effects have been accounted for 
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through expected value calculations. The operations correspond to (1) applying 
Bayes' theorem (equivalent to reversing an arc), (2) forming conditional 
expectations (equivalent to removing a chance node), and (3) maximizing the 
expected utility (equivalent to removing a decision node). The algorithm's 
results are the optimal decisions conditional on the information available when 
each decision is made, and the expected value of the decision strategies. The 
algorithm will work with multiply connected networks, although it is liable to 
the same NP-hardness problem that plagues exact probabilistic inference. 
One of the benefits of the influence diagram for representing and solving 
decision problems is the ease of estimating the value of information. In an 
influence diagram, value of information is calculated by adding an arc from a 
selected chance node to a decision ode and re-solving for the optimal decisions. 
The net improvement in expected value measures how much better decisions 
could be made given perfect knowledge about the variable. Other 
value-of-information calculations--for example, for imperfect or noisy 
information--can beperformed in a similar manner. 
STATE OF THE ART IN INFERENCE As just reviewed, there exist a number of 
exact techniques that can be used effectively for propagating beliefs and for 
finding optimal decisions for problems of moderate size, even when the latter are 
multiply connected. The Kim and Pearl algorithm will work efficiently for large 
belief networks as long as they are singly connected. Although the general 
inference problem in multiply connected belief networks and influence diagrams 
has been proven NP-hard, there are a number of promising approximation 
techniques. There is still considerable room for further esearch in refining these 
techniques and in broadening their applicability. Decision analysts generally 
deal with inference in complex problems by performing sensitivity analysis and 
eliminating unimportant variables until the model is small enough to be 
tractable. The development of automated algorithms employing this approach is 
an interesting area for research. Also, methods for decomposing multiply 
connected networks into a set of belief network subproblems and for reasoning 
about the application of combinations of alternative xact and approximate 
inference methods are promising areas of current investigation (Horvitz [87]). 
Explanation in Decision-Theoretic Expert Systems 
A common criticism of decision-theoretic reasoning is that it is difficult to 
explain (Szolovits [3], Davis [41], Politser [100]). Teach and Shortliffe [101] 
identified the ability of an expert system to explain its reasoning strategies and 
results to users as an important factor in its acceptance. Researchers have 
constructed systems that give explanations of logical reasoning for applications 
spanning the range from blocks worlds (Winograd [102]) to medicine (Shortliffe 
[103], Buchanan and Shortliffe [43], Swartout [104], Wallis and Shortliffe 
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[105], Patil [106]). Unfortunately, little has been done on the explanation of 
decision-theoretic inference. We shall review some of the ongoing research on 
techniques for justifying the results of decision-theoretic reasoning strategies. 
EVIDENCE WEIGHTS One approach to explaining probabilistic inference is to 
decompose a probabilistic result into a set of evidential subproblems, each 
focused on the relevance of a particular piece of evidence on the belief in 
alternative hypotheses. Within each subproblem, we relay the contribution of a 
piece of evidence to the belief assigned to competing hypotheses. The likelihood 
ratio and the logarithm of the likelihood ratio, In X(H, E, ~) termed the weight 
of evidence, have been used as the quantitative measures that capture the 
contribution of different pieces of evidence to belief in competing hypotheses. 
Under conditions of conditional independence, weights of evidence have the 
useful property of being additive. That is, the update in belief corresponding to
the combined evidence is just the sum of individual updates. The naturalness of
weights of evidence for acquiring and making inferences with uncertainty was 
first pointed out by Peirce in 1878 [106]. I. J. Good popularized the measure 
among philosophers of science and statisticians [81]. Several other researchers, 
including Turing (Good [81]) and Minsky and Selfridge [108]), independently 
found this measure to be useful. 
The additive property of evidence weights is conducive to producing 
informative graphical displays that represent he weights as the length of 
graphical elements to be added or subtracted. Several expert systems have made 
use of likelihood ratios and weights of evidence for explaining the relevance of 
evidence to hypotheses under consideration. Sequences of likelihood ratios are 
used to explain how evidence affects belief in competing hypotheses in the 
Glasgow-Dyspepsia expert system for assisting in gastroenterology diagnosis 
(Spiegelhalter and Knill-Jones [42]), in the Pathfinder system for reasoning 
about issue pathology (Horvitz et al. [71]), in the Neurex system for diagnosis 
of neurological findings (Reggia and Perricone [109]), and in the Medas system 
for assisting physicians in emergency medicine (Ben-Bassat et al. [70]). 
Likelihood ratios and weights of evidence also have been optionally converted 
from graphical to qualitative text descriptions in the Pathfinder and Medas 
projects. Pathfinder developers investigated the explanation of user-specific 
multiattribute-utility considerations associated with test decisions. Figure 4 
portrays a portion of a consultation with Pathfinder, demonstrating the 
explanation of probability and utility considerations at the basis of a recommen- 
dation. 
MODULATING COMPLETENESS AND ABSTRACTION Another approach to 
creating more natural decision-theoretic inference and explanation is to control 
the level of abstraction at which inference occurs. For example, rather than 
directly reasoning about he beliefs associated with each disease in response to a 
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I recommend that the fo l lowing features be evaluated: 
Architecture 




Which feature do you want jus t i f ied?  
None 
Architecture 




The fol lowing table elucidates the discriminating power of th is  
feature. The posit ion of the asterisk indicates which of the 





. . . . . . . .  * preserved 
. . . . . . . .  * par t ia l l y  ob l i terated 
. . . .  * . . . .  great ly  ob l i terated 
* . . . . . . . .  completely ob l l terated 
Pragmatic considerations in the evaluation of the feature, 
Architecture: 
. . . . . .  ! . .  tedium 
$ . . . . . . . .  cos t  
While i t  is somewhat tedious to answer, in part because 
i t  enta i l s  a sh i f t  in a t tent ion  f rom high-power to  
low-power, the question Archi tecture has been recommended 
because i t  is very good for  discr iminat ing between the two 
disease groups and enta i l s  no monetary cost. 
Figure 4. Graphical and Qualitative Explanation, Designed for a Nonexpert Patholo- 
gist, of Probability and Utility Considerations Associated with Information Acquisition in 
the Pathfinder System 
pattern of evidence observed in a tissue section under a microscope, a physician 
may prefer to reason about--and review explanations about--classes of disease, 
such as inflammatory, infectious, and malignant. At this higher level of 
abstraction, the uncertain reasoning problem is simplified and thus easier to 
understand and explain. A component of explanation research within the 
Pathfinder project studied the simplification of probabilistic inference through 
using heuristic abstraction hierarchies to control reasoning. The hierarchies are 
used to classify diseases into a set of disease groups that depends on the 
diagnostic problem at hand (Horvitz et al. [110]). Related research on the 
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naturalness of alternative grouping schemes has been conducted by Ben Bassat 
and Teeni [111]. 
Researchers also have investigated the application of decision theory at the 
metalevel to control the construction of explanations of decision-theoretic 
inference and of mathematical modeling (Horvitz [ 112], Mclaughlin [113]). The 
research as studied the explicit metareasoning about the costs, benefits, and 
trade-offs associated with alternative xplanations and with the understandability 
of alternative reasoning methods. The work centers on the use of multiattribute 
utility models to reason about explanation tradeoffs, such as the trade-off 
between the simplicity and the completeness of an explanation. 
QUALITATIVE EXPLANATION Determining the most important rationale for a 
recommendation allows a system to present an explanation qualitatively. 
Researchers have suggested that, as people may primarily use qualitative mental 
representations, it is useful to translate explanations of quantitative 
reasoning--for example, of decision-analytic models--into more qualitative 
descriptions (Henrion and Cooley [66]). Several projects have used this 
approach. 
Langlotz and associates [114] constructed a system called QXQ that explains 
medical decision analysis problems qualitatively. The system identifies the most 
important factors affecting a decision and applies a set of explanation heuristics. 
The quantitative probabilistic and utility models considered by the system are 
translated into qualitative xplanations of why particular decision have higher 
expected value than others. The Pathfinder team examined the usefulness of 
creating qualitative explanations through mapping linguistic modifiers onto 
probability and utility considerations. A qualitative xplanation from Pathfinder 
justifying an evidence-gathering recommendation is displayed at the bottom of 
Figure 4. Elsaesser employed a related approach for the qualitative xplanation 
of Bayesian updating [115]. Recent work by Klein has focused on the qualitative 
explanation of multiattribute utility models [116]. 
DECISION-THEORETIC TECHNIQUES IN AI 
Overview 
In previous sections, we discussed applications of a decision theory to AI 
problems with obvious relationships to expert-systems research; most research 
on applying decision theory has had this focus. However, the capabilities of 
decision-theoretic techniques for reasoning under uncertainty, considering 
complex preferences, and reasoning about decisions are applicable to other areas 
of AI. A major component of automated reasoning is decision making about he 
value of alternative representation and inference strategies for solving a 
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problem. For example, search problems can be recast as decision problems at 
each node in the search tree. This is not to suggest that decision theory should 
necessarily be chosen as a reasoning methodology. In many cases, it may be 
counterproductive to apply decision-theoretic inference and representation 
techniques explicitly. Even in these cases, decision theory can provide a 
framework useful for developing an approach and for reasoning about the 
usefulness of alternative problem-solving techniques. 
In recent years, the decision-theoretic framework has been applied to a 
number of problems in AI, including planning, control of inference, perception, 
learning, problem formulation, and nonmonotonic reasoning. We review briefly 
aspects of these research topics. More comprehensive discussions are found in 
the Kanal and Lemmer volume [117]. 
Recent Research 
The earliest and most prominent applications of decision theory in AI were in 
planning research, much of which centers on the construction of sequences of 
actions that will achieve a set of goals. Goal sets and operators are typically 
Boolean: If a plan does not successfully ead to a goal, it fails. Research on the 
application of decision theory to planning has focused on the evaluation of 
alternative plans, considering complex preferences based on several attributes. 
The decision-theoretic paradigm has been used to define the valuation function 
and the important uncertainties in a problem, as well as to select the best 
sequence of actions. Feldman and Sproull [118] showed how decision theory 
could be applied to control the application of planning operators in solving the 
monkey-and-bananas problem. Coles et al. [119] and Jacobs and Keifer [120] 
used utility theory to evaluate alternative plans for robots immersed in an 
uncertain world. Langlotz et al. applied decision theory to ranking alternative 
cancer therapy plans within the Oncocin project [121]. Wellman [122] has 
applied logical theorem-proving techniques to prove the dominance of a set of 
plans within a qualitative influence-diagram formalism. The qualitative influ- 
ence-diagram research centers on representing probabilistic dependencies 
qualitatively based on stochastic dominance. 
Decision theory also has been used for the control of inference. Most AI 
research on the control of inference has been based on heuristic control 
techniques (Davis [123], Erman et al. [124], Aikens [125]). Recent research 
has focused on the potential for decision theory to be useful in planning a 
problem-solving approach, in evaluating the costs and benefits of alternative 
inference methods, and in combining the effort of alternative inference (Good 
[126], Horvitz [127]). Smith [128] and Treitel and Genesereth [129] have 
applied decision theory to reasoning about the control of logical reasoning. 
Smith used expected value notions to select among search paths in database queries. 
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Treitel explored the costs associated with alternative sequentialization strategies 
in logical theorem proving. Horvitz [130] has investigated issues surrounding 
the application of decision theory to control several computational tasks 
including decision-theoretic inference itself. In this work, alternative reasoning 
strategies are evaluated through weighing their expected informational benefits 
with inference-related costs, such as the expense associated with delay. Russell 
and Wefald [131] have examined the application of decision theory in computer 
chess, building upon earlier work by Good [130] other recent research on 
decision-theoretic control, by Fehling and Breese, centers on the application of 
decision theory to a problem with robot planning [133], considering the costs 
and benefits of alternative reasoning strategies to a robot decision maker. 
Several research projects have examined the representation f the semantics of 
probabilistic knowledge within predicate calculus. Nilsson's probabilistic logic 
[134] extends the idea of logical entailment to probabilistic domains. Within 
probabilistic logic, the probability of any sentence in first-order predicate 
calculus is determined. The probabilities assigned to arbitrary combinations of
propositions are based on a logical analysis of alternative possible worlds. In 
related work, Cooper [135] developed an algorithm for calculating the 
probability of an arbitrary statement in propositional logic when a belief network 
is used as the representation f uncertainty. 
There also is ongoing work on the logical analysis of belief networks. Pearl 
[97] has developed logical techniques for reasoning about the allowable 
decompositions of belief-network problems. Such decomposition techniques 
focus on issues of relevance among portions of a belief network to reformulate 
an unwieldy inference problem into a set of smaller independent problems that 
can be solved more efficiently. 
Many problems remain in applying automated logical-reasoning techniques 
developed by AI investigators to the construction of decision models. At the 
foundations ofany decision model are decisions about he propositions to include 
within the decision basis, which often are based on logical relationships. Several 
researchers have examined the automated construction of decision models 
(Holtzman [78], Breese and Tse [136], Wellman [122]). There are many 
unanswered questions regarding the automated assembling, pruning, and 
reasoning about decision models. There is potential to develop tools for assisting 
engineers with the construction ofinfluence diagrams in the spirit of recent work 
by Heckerman on the efficient representation f alternative classes of indepen- 
dence among propositions [52]. 
It is clear that incompleteness of knowledge and the possibility of changing 
information is intrinsic to almost all complex real-world problem solving. 
Nonmonotonic logics deal with new information by formalizing the process of 
defeating beliefs within a logical framework. Probability theory assigns a 
continuous measure of belief and provides mechanisms for updating in light of 
new information. Several researchers are integrating these perspectives as a 
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means of dealing with incomplete and changing information (Loui [137], 
Neufeld and Poole [138], Grosof [139]). 
Decision theory also can be applied to problems involving modal reasoning. 
Analogous to extensions of first-order predicate calculus to modal reasoning, the 
language of probability theory can be extended to describe the uncertain beliefs 
that one agent holds about another agent's beliefs (Gaifman [140], Frisch and 
Haddawy [141]). Decision analysis can be applied to communication and 
cooperation issues. Thus, an autonomous agent could be endowed with the 
ability to apply utility theory and probability theory to reason about the 
knowledge and potential behaviors of ~inother agent (Rosenschein and Breese 
[142]). Related work within decision science has investigated the application of 
decision theory to reasoning about the actions of competing decision makers 
(Raiffa [143], Wilson [144], Strait [145]). 
Decision theory can provide a framework for considering the relationships 
among alternative inference strategies. Langlotz et al. [73] describe an attempt 
to justify heuristic default strategies with decision theory. Other work has 
demonstrated how a "suboptimal" default or approximate strategy could be 
preferred to a complete decision-theoretic analysis given the cost of reasoning, 
and the importance of techniques for gracefully degrading the value of a 
system's performance from a complete analysis to an approximate one as the 
costs of representation r reasoning resources increase (Horvitz [87, 146]). As 
we mentioned inthe second section of this article, analyses have been carried out 
in attempts to understand how alternative formalisms for reasoning under 
uncertainty--such as nonmonotonic reasoning (Ginsberg [ 147]), fuzzy set theory 
(Zadeh [11]), and Dempster-Shafer theory [13]--relate to probabilistic reason- 
ing. See Kanal and Lemmer [117] for some detailed analyses of these 
approaches. 
The application of influence diagrams in new areas is facilitated by their 
relatively unconstrained dependency structure at the level of relation. As an 
example, machine-vision researchers have applied probabilistic inference to 
perceptual tasks. In recent research, Binford et al. [148] have used a belief 
network to assign probabilities to alternative plausible three-dimensional 
objects, given a two-dimensional projection. 
Other researchers have examined learning within the decision-theoretic 
framework. Machine-learning researchers have dwelled almost exclusively on 
deterministic relationships. Concepts developed in learning research, such as 
bias and explanation-based generalization, might be extended to learning 
examples of greater complexity through the integration of decision-theoretic 
notions. Star [149] described how explanation-based generalization models for 
learning might be extended to reason about preferences under uncertainty 
through the application of decision theory. 
Decision-theoretic approaches also hold promise for extending AI discovery 
research. Several research projects have been undertaken toapply probabilistic 
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reasoning to discovery. Within the Radix project (Blum [150]), probabilistic and 
logical reasoning have been used to control the generation and confirmation of 
hypotheses about interesting relationships within a large medical database. 
Cheeseman and associates have studied the automatic nduction of a useful set of 
categories from data acquired by sensors on a wandering robot [151]. Pearl and 
Verma [64] described logical methods for reformulating belief networks to 
suggest plausible causal relationships to explain a set of probabilistic relation- 
ships. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We have reviewed the application of concepts from decision science to AI 
research. Despite their different perspectives, decision science and AI have 
common roots and strive for similar goals. We have concentrated on current 
expert-systems research at the crossroads of AI and decision science. Histori- 
cally, the development of heuristic reasoning methods arose partly in response to 
the complexity and poor expressiveness of the early probabilistic expert systems. 
Popular heuristic schemes, such as the rule-based approach to reasoning under 
uncertainty, were intended to be more tractable and expressive than probabilistic 
inference. However, recent work has uncovered inconsistencies in and 
limitations of these heuristic schemes, and has shown that they can lead to 
unreliable conclusions. From the decision-theoretic perspective, it is clear that 
no scheme for reasoning about complex decisions under uncertainty can avoid 
making assumptions about prior belief and independence, whether these 
assumptions are implicit or explicit. 
Recognition of the difficulties of the heuristic approaches, coupled with the 
promise of more tractable and expressive decision-theoretic representation a d 
inference strategies seems to be stimulating renewed interest in the decision- 
theoretic approaches to automated problem solving. In particular, belief 
networks and influence diagrams are appealing knowledge-representation 
schemes. They can express knowledge about uncertain beliefs and relationships 
in both qualitative and more quantitative forms in a flexible, yet principled, 
fashion. These representations are being used in several areas of expert-systems 
research including the development of graphical knowledge-acquisition t ols; 
the search for efficient algorithms for inference and decision in complex, 
multiply connected belief networks and influence diagrams, and the develop- 
ment of techniques for explaining decision-theoretic reasoning. 
Although recent research on the application of decision-science id as in expert 
systems eems promising, for the most part only prototype systems have been 
demonstrated so far (Agogino and Rege [152], Andreassen et al. [153], Breese 
[154], Cooper [62], Henrion and Cooley [66], Higgins [155], Holtzman [78], 
Horvitz et al. [71], Heckerman [52]). There is an urgent need for further 
research on the sensitivity of various inference schemes to seemingly unrealistic 
assumptions. Such research could determine the conditions under which the 
Decision Theory in Expert Systems and AI 291 
assumptions lead to serious errors. Continuing investigation on the successes 
and failures of heuristic methods also might lead to the discovery of useful and 
well-characterized approximation techniques for specific problem-solving con- 
texts. 
Moving beyond expert systems, we see substantial opportunities for applica- 
tion of ideas from decision science and AI to planning and problem solving, 
control of reasoning, speech recognition, vision, temporal reasoning, and 
learning. However, substantial barriers remain in applying these ideas in 
automated reasoners. Problems still unresolved include the construction and 
maintenance of large, coherent knowledge bases; inference in large, arbitrary 
belief networks and influence diagrams; automation of sensitivity analysis for 
knowledge ngineering and computation; generation and screening of alterna- 
tives; qualitative abstraction ofdecision models and conclusions; and automated 
construction of decision models. Many of these problems have not been 
addressed in detail within the expert-systems research program, yet are crucial 
for developing theoretical methods and computational rchitectures for auto- 
mated reasoners. 
In summary, we believe that the investigation of central problems in 
representation a d inference can be facilitated within the decision-theoretic 
framework. Conversely, there are indications that AI can make contributions to
problems and assist in developing relatively unexplored frontiers in the decision 
sciences. We anticipate major advances in both AI and decision science based on 
increased interaction between the disciplines. We hope that this paper will help 
to promote such collaboration. For now, we temper our enthusiasm about early 
developments and await the results of ongoing theoretical work as well as the 
accumulation of experience with the application of decision-science techniques 
in automated reasoning systems. 
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